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Photography and the disruption of memory and meaning  
Tim Fawns, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
By taking and sharing photographs, we are positioned within powerful communication 
networks that influence our personal and social identities. Over time, ownership and 
control is lost as our photographs gain performativity that allows them to divert from the 
purposes, spaces and times for which they are created. These issues are magnified by a 
number of technological, cultural and economic factors that accompany the evolution of 
ubiquitous digital media and their associated tools. Given the role that photographs play 
in the reconstruction of individual and collective memory and history, it is worth 










If there is a case for the statement ‘the camera never lies’, it is in the sense that what is 
produced by the camera becomes part of the ‘truth’. The photograph is analogous to 
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history, where what is written down becomes, over time, what we believe to have 
happened. This article is a reflection on the nature of personal photography and how it 
changes the people who engage with it. 
 
Photography: Truth, representation or performance? 
Although most photographs look very much like the scene that was photographed, there 
are a number of important differences. First, the photograph is limited in terms of the 
space it represents. It leaves out what is above, below, behind, to the right and to left of 
its edges and one cannot look behind the objects it shows (Szarkowski 1980). It flattens 
and crops the world (Christmann 2008). Second, although it is of a time, a photograph 
contains little or no time. Other than what can be inferred from visual clues, it does not 
show what happened before and after the shutter closed. Photographs leave out touch, 
taste, smell and sound, containing only visual information, which has been manipulated 
by the interplay between environmental and technological factors (e.g. the qualities of the 
camera, its handling of lighting and movement). The relationship between material reality 
and its photographic representation is further compromised through intentional and 
unintentional effects of camera settings and post-production processes.  
 
Even before it takes a photograph, a camera is a powerful object. It changes the 
behaviour of those behind and in front of it (Sontag 1977), introducing a performative 
quality to both posing for and taking photographs. Thus, scenes are often altered and 
contrived in pre-production as people stop what they are doing and smile, assemble for a 
group shot or, perhaps, attempt to affect a ‘natural’ pose. Those not in the photograph 
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may feel compelled to watch or to walk around the ‘photographic space’ (a notion studied 
by Stanley Milgram (1977)), itself a clue to the spatial limitations of the photograph, 
though it is likely this compulsion is being eroded as it becomes impractical to avoid 
every photograph. In any case, an intrusive photographic event is inserted into lived 
experience, changing the very thing we wish to preserve.  
 
Just as a diary often betrays ‘an awareness of its potential to be read by others’ (Van 
Dijck 2007: 54), photos are created for a potential audience. We communicate important 
ideas about ourselves to others through photographs and we change (and constrain) our 
behaviour when being photographed in an attempt to portray ourselves in a favourable 
light. Increasingly, it seems, we attempt to control both aspects of performance, to be 
simultaneously director and actor. ‘Selfie’ (a photographic self-portrait) is the Oxford 
Dictionary’s word of 2013 due to a 17000 per cent increase in usage over the year 
(Guardian 2013). As the extent to which we are photographed (whether by ourselves or 
by others) increases, our awareness of our potential photographic image changes with it. 
Cameras, whether used for personal, reportage or surveillance purposes (and, indeed, 
these categories increasingly overlap), are becoming ubiquitous. As a result, we must 
take into account – whenever we are in public, at least – that we may be photographed. 
 
Perhaps we are right to be concerned by the photographs that are produced of us. 
Whether they appear in pornography, on dating websites, in magazines, on social 
networking sites, or in any other place, people are commodified within photographs. 
Their images can be examined, manipulated and redistributed without their presence, 
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consent or awareness. Our ability to interact with photographs as a substitute for people 
led McLuhan (2005) to call photography a ‘Brothel-without-walls’. As well as people, 
photography also commodifies experience. Within tourism, for example, we are sold 
flights and hotels through photographs of places we have never been. Once there, we take 
our own pictures as souvenirs and, perhaps, on a subconscious level, we take into account 
the sort of photographs that might be produced when choosing a destination (Slater 
1995). Thus, commodification works in both directions – we take photographs of our 
more ‘profitable’ relationships, activities and environments, and potential photographic 
value influences our choices as, in part, we seek out behaviours and destinations that 
generate good photographs (Sontag 1977). As Slater writes, ‘we construct ourselves for 
the image and through images’ (1995: 134, original emphasis). 
 
Within our collections, where are the photographs of people doing household chores, 
working, commuting, being ill, watching TV or most of the things that make up the 
majority of our time? Some of our biggest concerns – finances, health, etc. – are seldom 
represented or even closely associated with any of our images. Personal photographs 
generally emphasize action, happiness and popularity to the general exclusion of 
unhappy, salacious or mundane activity (Slater 1995). Though exponentially expanding 
digital storage capacity has redefined what is considered ‘photo-worthy’ (see Lindley 
2012; Van House et al. 2005), and collections include photographs that are mundane, 
playful, bizarre or accidental, we are still unlikely to see images of ourselves doing the 
washing up. Cameras capture only a fraction of who we are and what we do; yet, the 
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content of the resulting photographs is privileged within our socially constructed 
identities (Sarvas and Frohlich 2011) and, consequently, our memories.  
 
Memory 
Episodic memory involves the subjective re-experiencing of personal events and is not 
fixed or flat like the photograph but involves movement, non-visual sensory information 
and reconstruction (Tulving 1972). Although they are often thought of as synonymous 
with memories (Batchen 2006), photographs act as cues that help us to mentally 
reconstruct related episodes. Episodic memory, unlike photographs, fades over time 
(Schacter 2007) – a notion many of us struggle to accept. The photographer uses the 
camera to stave off the loss of memory, attempting to correct a perceived flaw – the 
tendency of our biological brains to rapidly forget the details and imagery of our 
experience. As such, we often trust photographs more than human memory (Haldrup and 
Larsen 2003). However, a number of factors can derail the photograph’s value to us as a 
tool for remembering our past.  
 
To begin with, the stability of photographs can limit the flexibility with which we 
reinterpret the past. While we are able to think of ourselves differently over time, our 
photographs continue to remind those who view them of aspects of ourselves or our 
experience that we may wish to be forgotten. Many of us have photographs that we avoid 
looking at so that we do not have to face some aspect of our past. When our photographs 
move into the public domain, our control over such information is compromised. 
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It is inevitable that, within our memories, some aspects of experience will be sharpened 
over time while other aspects fade (Conway 2005). Taking photographs is an attempt to 
take control of this, but rather than stopping the fading process it simply changes what is 
preserved and what is forgotten. Koutstaal et al. (1999) found that looking at photographs 
can reinforce memory for an event at the expense of other events for which photos are not 
reviewed. Thus, those things we have photographs of can become privileged within 
memory. Sometimes, our memory moves even closer to the photographic image as we 
come to privilege not just what is in the photograph but the photograph itself (Bate 2010). 
Our memory is susceptible to externalized representations (Sacchi et al. 2007) and 
sometimes we recall a static, rectangular and purely visual image as a result of exposure 
to photography. As a personal example, when I think of Christmas ten years ago, the first 
image that appears in my mind is a staged photograph of the people who were there, 
rather than any ‘direct’ memory of the event itself. It requires effort on my part to move 
beyond the photograph into the movement, sounds and associations of episodic memory.  
 
This phenomenon was alluded to by Roland Barthes (1981: 91) when he wrote that ‘Not 
only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory… it actually blocks memory, quickly 
becomes a counter-memory’. David Bate (2010) draws from Freud (1980) to conceive of 
certain photographs as ‘screen memories’ that encapsulate and, thereby, impede our 
access to important memories. Both Barthes’ and Bate’s ideas relate to the psychological 
phenomenon of retroactive interference where a newer ‘memory’ blocks a similar, older 
one (Baddeley 1999). Photographs may interfere with our reconstruction of visual 
imagery, making it easier for us to picture a scene but harder for us to relive it, to feel as 
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if we were there. Fortunately, it does not appear to be a simple equation where more 
photographs equals more interference. Since many of us now have large photo collections 
yet are still able to remember reasonable amounts of past experience, this phenomenon is 
perhaps restricted to a few, select photographs that become the personal equivalent of 
iconic images that stand in for a host of related memories. It is likely that this is 
dependent on the extent to which we review our photographs and rehearse the stories they 
relate to (which, as we will see, is not all that much). 
 
The possibility of remembering only the contents of our photographs seems preferable to 
the possibility of forgetting an event entirely, and so we use photography to create 
opportunities for nostalgia and future remembering. It turns out, however, that we are 
poor strategists in this regard. For one thing, we exaggerate how much most photographs 
and the experiences they document will matter to us later. We over-inflate the importance 
of the present due to what Schkade and Kahneman (1998: 340) call the focusing illusion: 
‘Nothing in life is quite as important as you think it is while you are thinking about it’. 
According to Kahneman (2011), we have an ‘experiencing self’ who lives in the present 
moment and a ‘remembering self’ who keeps track of the story of our life to help us make 
decisions. This story is a highly selective and simplified account that leaves out the vast 
majority of our experience and perhaps the experiencing self takes photographs in an 
attempt to influence it. Yet the remembering self must be selective because we simply 
cannot use all of the information we perceive. Just as making all of the text in this article 
bold would not help you to remember it, taking photographs of everything we encounter 
would not help us to remain conscious of it: if everything is important then nothing is. 
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Despite our reluctance to let certain moments pass without recording them, or to delete 
photographs even when we do not value them (Whittaker et al. 2012), the first thing that 
normally happens to a photo after some brief, initial attention, is that it is forgotten. In 
1995, Slater claimed that most families did not look at their (pre-digital) photographs 
more than once per year and that most photographs remained in the envelopes they were 
placed in by a developer. In the earlier days of digital photography, most photos stayed 
on the camera or were downloaded to a hard drive and then forgotten (Whittaker et al. 
2010). These trends suggest that it is the taking and having of photos, rather than looking 
at them, organizing them or sharing them, that we find most engaging. Nevertheless, 
while most photograph collections are seldom constructed or used in the way their 
creators intend (Whittaker et al. 2010), the component photographs still function as 
memory artefacts in a variety of unpredictable ways. We stumble across forgotten 
photographs while doing other things, sparking new insights from old memories 
(Frohlich et al. 2012). The nature of stumbling is changing radically as, in contrast to 
lying unused in paper envelopes or digital folders, photographs are increasingly uploaded 
to the cloud via an automatic or semi-automatic process, ending up in public spaces.  
 
Digital disruption: Losing control 
Pre-digital processes of photographic production, distribution and consumption were 
relatively discrete and defined: photos were taken, then developed, then collected and 
then shown to other people, put into albums or simply put away. Digital developments 
are compressing these practices together. The ability to look at photos on the camera 
Published version:  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/intellect/ubiq/2014/00000003/F0020001/art00001  
9 
means that consumption can happen immediately after production, disrupting established 
processes of anticipation and rehearsal of the photographs that are taken and enabling 
new processes of practice, experimentation and retaking. Distribution – even 
internationally – can happen immediately after production or, in the case of automatic 
uploading services such as Google Plus, simultaneously.  
 
There are a number of consequences to this compression. The barriers that are broken 
down have historically acted as filters. For example, the expense of film and development 
reduced the number of photographs and helped us to avoid collections that were too large 
for us to keep organized or to meaningfully engage with the majority of their contents. 
The intervention of a professional developer probably lessened the likelihood of our 
taking compromising images. The physical dimension of pre-digital photographs 
restricted the spaces where they would appear. The removal of these barriers has led to 
complications of control, privacy and context.  
 
Before online photo sharing, collections were mostly controlled by the person who had 
taken the photographs. Now, if a photograph is networked by being uploaded to a photo-
sharing website or a blog, or sent via e-mail, it is freed, to a large extent, from its original 
owner’s control. Out of sight, it proliferates as copies are downloaded or amalgamated by 
friends, strangers and non-human entities such as search engines. The photographer 
cannot guarantee who can see it or where it will turn up.  
 
 
Published version:  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/intellect/ubiq/2014/00000003/F0020001/art00001  
10 
 
Figure 1: Cats on Flickr. 
 
It comes to be viewed not alongside its former neighbours (photographs taken on the 
same camera at a similar time and place) but in thematic categories orchestrated through 
its metadata (e.g. all photos tagged as ‘cat’). From here, it can be found and used by 
anyone for almost any purpose (Jackson 2009). Questions of audience (who can see / has 
seen this photo?), place (where is the photo?), ownership (whose is this version of this 
photo?) and purpose (what is the photo used for?) are all much more difficult to answer 
now than they were just 10 years ago.  
 
As the context in which they are viewed changes, photos come to express things that their 
authors did not intend (Rose 2006). Consider the picture of the first Zeiss planetarium on 
[p. x] that was taken in 1923. This photograph presumably came into being through a 
chemical process, was printed on paper and has been scanned into digital form. Here it is 
in print again – or perhaps you are reading an on-screen PDF or some mashed-up, 
decontextualized form of this text that I have not anticipated. In any case, the 
photographer is probably no longer alive and will almost certainly never know that his 
photograph appeared in a journal about pervasive, digital media he could probably not 
imagine. In this issue of Ubiquity, it is used to contrast a historical dome with related, 
contemporary architecture. When it was taken, it was presumably for the purpose of 
documenting a modern event. This example shows the capacity for the photograph to say 
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Context is, perhaps, more significant for photographs of people. The photograph 
displayed here as Figure 2 has been unbound from the context in which it was created, 
where the behaviour portrayed may have seemed more reasonable (or, indeed, less 
reasonable). It is difficult to resist judging those people we see in images, despite not 
knowing their side of the story. We take the photograph as evidence even if we do not 
know what it is evidence of. An important step towards digital literacy involves learning 
to forgive these perceived transgressions as quotations taken out of context. At the same 
time, some level of restraint is advisable in producing and distributing images since we 
cannot be there to explain a potentially compromising photograph in each of its 
destinations. 
 
Figure 2: People out of context. 
 
Images of ourselves bear a hint of the doppelgänger, where one can simultaneously be 
looking at and be in the photograph. Two selves diverge as the camera’s shutter closes: 
one living, ageing and evolving, the other photographic, fixed in age and appearance, yet 
interpreted differently with each new context in which it is perceived. Each photographic 
self produced in this way is of a different time, yet they all exist at the same time – now. 
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By positing images in online environments, Bayne (2008: 9) writes that ‘we scatter our 
“bodies” across the web where they gain a kind of independence as nodes for 
commentary, connection and appropriation by others’. As avatars, for example, 
photographs are treated as a proxy for our embodied selves. Where the person in a 
photograph is well known, the representation can be mistaken for the thing it represents: 
‘People, quite literally, see through them; they do not see a photograph of a “loved one”, 
only the person’ (Haldrup and Larsen 2003: 41).  
 
As time passes, the photographic image does not evolve to reflect our current appearance, 
although our interpretation of it does evolve to reflect our current attitude and context. On 
Facebook, for example, an old profile picture can create an impression of currency by 
appearing beside current posts. In Facebook’s case, changing the profile image updates 
the old picture that stood beside every post across the user’s timeline, again disrupting the 
relationship between current identity and past perspectives through the suggestion that 
the present self currently endorses each old post. 
 
Conclusion 
Photographs are strange and complex things. They take the place of our memories, 
wearing away at our own reconstructions of imagery and association and privileging their 
content and metadata over what we may otherwise have found important. They do not 
record history, but determine it.   
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The compression, through evolving digital affordances, of production, distribution and 
consumption increases the complexity of the networks in which we position ourselves – 
and are positioned – through photographs. Through online distribution, photographs 
proliferate and escape the bonds of their original context, disrupting control, privacy and 
meaning. This disruption affects the way that we are represented by our images, which, 
wherever they turn up, express ideas without our knowledge or consent and without 
reference to our current perspective.  
 
We are learning the consequences of these developments as we go. Until we find a 
common balance of control, restraint and forgiveness, we are likely to face challenges of 
constrained identities, threats to our self-image and an over-privileging within memory of 
the contents of our photographs. Despite all of this, we continue to take increasing 
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